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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged Jeramey Storm Anderson with possession of a controlled substance
(heroin) and possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), after officers found
residue containing heroin and methamphetamine in a safe taken from his car. During his jury
trial, Mr. Anderson testified the safe was not his and he could not open it.

However,

Mr. Anderson also testified he consumed methamphetamine before the traffic stop. There was a
hung jury on the possession of heroin count, but the jury convicted Mr. Anderson for possession
of methamphetamine.
Mr. Anderson appealed, asserting the State did not present sufficient evidence to support
his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). He also asserted the
State committed prosecutorial misconduct by arguing the jury could convict him for possession
of methamphetamine based on the uncharged conduct of consuming methamphetamine before
the traffic stop. Additionally, Mr. Anderson asserted the district court erred when it did not give
a unanimity jury instruction, because the jury was faced with two distinct acts of possession.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Anderson did not show that the evidence
at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of methamphetamine, he did not show
fundamental error in the prosecutor’s argument that Mr. Anderson’s trial admission was
evidence of guilt of the possession of methamphetamine charge, and Mr. Anderson did not show
fundamental error in the district court’s not giving a unanimity jury instruction. (See Resp.
Br., pp.4-21.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Anderson’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the State present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Anderson’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)?

II.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct by contending in closing arguments that
the jury could convict Mr. Anderson for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) based on the uncharged conduct of consuming methamphetamine?

III.

Did the district court err when it did not give a unanimity instruction for the change of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), because the jury was faced
with two distinct acts of possession?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Support Mr. Anderson’s Conviction For
Possession Of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine)

A.

Introduction
Mr. Anderson asserts that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). The jury’s verdict on
possession of methamphetamine was necessarily based on Mr. Anderson consuming
methamphetamine before the traffic stop, not on the methamphetamine found in the residue in
the safe. However, the jury could not properly find that the substance Mr. Anderson allegedly
consumed before the traffic stop was methamphetamine. The State did not present laboratory
test results showing the substance was methamphetamine, nor did the State present sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove its identity.

B.

The Jury’s Verdict On Possession Of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) Was
Necessarily Based On The Methamphetamine Mr. Anderson Allegedly Consumed Before
The Traffic Stop
Part of the jury did not believe the State’s theory that Mr. Anderson possessed the residue

in the safe. (See R., pp.187-88; Tr., p.357, Ls.12-19, p.360, Ls.7-11.) Thus, Mr. Anderson
asserts the jury’s verdict on possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) was
necessarily based on Mr. Anderson consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop, not on
the methamphetamine found in the residue in the safe.
The State argues Mr. Anderson “cites no law in support of his argument that the court
should speculate on why a jury hung on one count and on that basis ignore evidence of guilty on
a different count.

Therefore, his legally unsupported argument must be rejected.” (Resp.
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Br., p.6.)

Mr. Anderson submits, based on the argument and authority presented in the

Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., pp.11-12), and below, that his assertions regarding this issue are
not waived. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
The State also argues Mr. Anderson’s assertion “is directly contrary to the applicable
legal standards.” (See Resp. Br., p.7.) As the State correctly notes (see Resp. Br., p.7), when an
appellate court determines whether a conviction should be upheld, the inquiry is whether “after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))
(emphasis in original). However, “[t]his familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of
the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Further,
“[i]n conducting this analysis,” an appellate court does not “substitute our judgment for that of
the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence.” Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460.
After assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence in this case,
at least some members of the jury decided the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Anderson possessed the residue in the safe. When the State argues this Court “is not
required to accept the jurors’ judgment as to the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to this
count on which they convicted,” or “to accept some of the jurors’ judgment as to the sufficiency
of the evidence in support of other counts” (see Resp. Br., p.7), the State suggests the Court
should infer the jury in this case was irrational.
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The State also argues that Mr. Anderson’s “speculations on the thinking of the juror(s)
unconvinced of his guilt on the heroin and introduction counts is directly contrary to the
requirement that the Court ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable’ to upholding the jury
verdict.” (See Resp. Br., p.7.) The State’s characterization of the evidence goes beyond the
evidence actually presented at trial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.
For example, the State contends, “this Court cannot rule out the possibility that the
juror(s) merely believed the evidence connecting him to the methamphetamine residue on the
can was stronger than the evidence connecting him to the heroin.” (See Resp. Br., p.8.) The
State thereby ignores the evidence showing the methamphetamine and heroin in the residue in
the safe were mixed together. (See Tr., p.152, Ls.19-25; Tr., p.214, L.14 – p.216, L.24.) There
was no evidence that the methamphetamine and heroin from the safe were in different materials.
Thus, even viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, a rational juror could not have believed the evidence connecting
Mr. Anderson to the methamphetamine from the safe was somehow stronger than the evidence
connecting him to the heroin found in the very same residue.
Further, the State argues, “the Court must conclude that the juror(s) voting to acquit [on
the introduction of certain articles into a correctional facility count] felt that [Mr.] Anderson had
believed he had consumed all his methamphetamine, and therefore regurgitating the bag with
some methamphetamine still inside at the jail did not amount to ‘knowingly’ introducing the
methamphetamine to the jail.” (See Resp. Br., p.8.) However, there was no evidence presented
at trial that the baggy found in the jail booking shower area had vomit, gastric acid, or other
substances on it that would indicate it had been swallowed and later regurgitated. Rather,
Officer Morlock and Deputy Marcak testified the baggy appeared to have been chewed on, was
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wet, had a red substance on it, and had a yellow substance inside. (See Tr., p.195, L.22 – p.196,
L.3, p.239, Ls.14-20.) Even viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could not have believed Mr. Anderson
swallowed the baggy found in the booking shower area and later regurgitated it.
Considering part of the jury did not believe the State’s theories that Mr. Anderson
possessed the residue or introduced the baggy into the jail, it follows that at least some members
of the jury convicted Mr. Anderson for possession of methamphetamine under the other theory
advanced by the State on the possession of methamphetamine count; namely, that Mr. Anderson
possessed methamphetamine by consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop.

(See

Tr., p.327, Ls.18-25.) The jury’s verdict on possession of methamphetamine was necessarily
based on Mr. Anderson consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop.

C.

The Jury Could Not Properly Find That The Substance Mr. Anderson Allegedly
Consumed Before The Traffic Stop Was Methamphetamine
Mr. Anderson asserts the jury could not properly find that the substance he allegedly

consumed before the traffic stop was methamphetamine. The State did not present laboratory
test results showing the substance Mr. Anderson allegedly consumed before the traffic stop was
methamphetamine. (See generally Tr., pp.202-221.) The State also did not present sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove the substance’s identity. See State v. Tryon, ___ P.3d ___, 2018
WL 1124268 (2018).
In response, the State argues, “with inferences taken in favor of the state, the evidence
shows that the baggie on the jail floor next to [Mr.] Anderson’s clothes was the same baggie that
had held the methamphetamine he had consumed, either because he failed to entirely consume
the baggie and all of its contents or because it was otherwise regurgitated as [Mr.] Anderson
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became sick.” (See Resp. Br., p.9.) The evidence does not support a reasonable inference that
Mr. Anderson swallowed and later regurgitated the baggy found in the jail booking shower area.
At best, the State’s contention in closing argument (see Resp. Br., p.9), was that the
methamphetamine Mr. Anderson ate could have been in the baggy, “[a]nd he could be convicted
of both possessing methamphetamine that he ate, as well as the baggy, by introducing the same
baggy into the jail that tested positive for methamphetamine” (see Tr., p.331, Ls.5-12). But, as
explained above, the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that Mr. Anderson
swallowed the baggy and later regurgitated it. Further, Mr. Anderson testified that he did not
bring anything with him into the jail. (See Tr., p.301, Ls.4-9.)
The State also contends Mr. Anderson’s admissions “were direct evidence of the nature
of the substance.” (See Resp. Br., p.9.) However, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has held, “it
remains incumbent upon the State to provide evidence that meets the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chemical analysis of a substance remains the preferable and the most reliable
evidence of its identity, and the sufficiency of less direct evidence must be evaluated on a caseby-case basis.”

State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 136 (Ct. App. 1997).

Thus, even if

Mr. Anderson’s admissions constitute direct rather than circumstantial evidence, the State
nonetheless had to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the
substance Mr. Anderson allegedly consumed before the traffic stop.
The State did not meet that burden here. Unlike the informant in Mitchell, who testified
he was familiar with methamphetamine because he had purchased and used it five or six times
before the purchase at issue in that case, see Mitchell, 130 Idaho at 136-37, Mr. Anderson did not
provide testimony establishing his prior use of or familiarity with methamphetamine (see, e.g.,
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Tr., p.304, L.9 – p.305, L.2). Like the defendant in Tryon, see id. at ___, 2018 WL 1124268,
at *4, Mr. Anderson was not a known or suspected methamphetamine dealer.
The evidence cited by the State as corroborating Mr. Anderson’s admission as to the
nature of the substance (see Resp. Br., p.10), does not actually help show the identity of the
substance. While the State argues Mr. Anderson “appeared to be extremely under the influence
later that night in the jail” (Resp. Br., p.10), Deputy Marcak did not testify that he thought
Mr. Anderson was specifically under the influence of methamphetamine (see Tr., p.238, Ls.1719). Moreover, Mr. Anderson’s jail phone calls referencing eating a substance and being sick
did not identify the substance as methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.282, L.23 – p.283, L.20, p.294,
L.9 – p.295, L.5. See generally State’s Exs. 7, 8 & 9.)
The State did not present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Anderson’s conviction for
possession of methamphetamine.

Thus, the judgment of conviction for possession of a

controlled substance (methamphetamine) should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded
to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge. See Tryon, ___ P.3d
at ___, 2018 WL 1124268, at *6.

II.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Contending In Closing Arguments That The
Jury Could Convict Mr. Anderson For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
(Methamphetamine) Based On The Uncharged Conduct Of Consuming Methamphetamine

A.

Introduction
Mr. Anderson asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by contending in

closing arguments that the jury could convict him for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) based on the uncharged conduct of consuming methamphetamine before the

9

traffic stop. By arguing the jury could convict Mr. Anderson for uncharged conduct, the State
violated his right to due process. Although Mr. Anderson did not contemporaneously object to
the State’s improper closing arguments, he asserts the State’s prosecutorial misconduct here
constitutes fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226-28 (2010).

B.

The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct By Contending In Closing Arguments
The Jury Could Convict Mr. Anderson Based On Uncharged Conduct, Violating His
Unwaived Constitutional Right To Due Process
Mr. Anderson asserts the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by contending in

closing arguments the jury could convict him for possession of methamphetamine on the basis of
the uncharged conduct of consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop. By arguing the
jury could convict Mr. Anderson based on that uncharged conduct, the State violated his
unwaived constitutional right to due process. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 314; Carr v. Pridgen, 157 Idaho 238, 244 (2014).
The State disputes whether Mr. Anderson’s unwaived constitutional right to due process
was violated. The State argues Mr. Anderson “was charged with a single act of possession of
methamphetamine on a specific date,” and that Mr. Anderson’s possession of methamphetamine
was a single crime as opposed to multiple offenses. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) The State thereby
contends that Mr. Anderson had been charged with possession of the methamphetamine he
consumed.

(See Resp. Br., p.15.)

However, the applicable standards instead indicate

Mr. Anderson’s alleged acts of possession by consuming methamphetamine before the traffic
stop, and possession of the residue found in the safe, were separate and distinct acts. Because the
State only charged Mr. Anderson for possession of the residue found in the safe, the act of
possession by consuming methamphetamine was uncharged conduct.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[w]hether a course of criminal conduct should be
divided or aggregated depends on whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct, and
independent crimes.” State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414 (1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

“This inquiry requires consideration of the circumstances of the conduct, and

consideration of the intent and objective of the actor.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “The latter are of particular importance in cases of crimes of possession, which
involve knowledge or awareness of control over something rather than an act or omission to act.”
Id. As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief in the context of unanimity jury instructions (see App.
Br., p.30), an appellate court “must ask whether there was a ‘distinct union of mens rea and actus
reus separated by a discrete period of time and circumstance from any other such similar
incident’ for each of the alleged acts of possession.” See State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 182
(Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268 (Ct. App. 2000)).
As shown in Mr. Anderson’s Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., pp.30-32), the acts were
separate and distinct acts of criminal conduct. The acts occurred at different times in different
locations, and Mr. Anderson’s apparent intent and objective were different with respect to each
act. Cf. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182.
The State also argues the charge “included all of the methamphetamine [Mr. Anderson]
possessed on the relevant date.” (See Resp. Br., p.15.) However, before the trial, the State had
not

accused

Mr.

Anderson

of

possessing

methamphetamine

through

consuming

methamphetamine before the traffic stop. (See, e.g., R., pp.108-09; Tr., p.109, L.21 – p.110,
L.3.)

Further, an information “must set forth a concise statement of the facts constituting the

alleged offense sufficient that the particular offense may be identified with certainty as to time,
place and persons involved.”

See State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151 (Ct. App. 2003).
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Stretching the scope of the information’s language here to cover the State’s contention in closing
argument would go against that principle. Under the State’s argument on appeal, the charge in
Mr. Anderson’s information would have allowed for a conviction if he had instead admitted to
consuming methamphetamine 24 hours prior to the incident, as opposed to in the minutes before
the traffic stop. The expansion represented by the State’s argument would preclude certain
identification of the particular offense under such circumstances. See Dorsey, 139 Idaho at 151.
Additionally, the State writes that Mr. Anderson “argues that because the state did not
articulate its intent to rely on the methamphetamine he consumed to prove its charge in various
points in the proceedings it somehow misled his trial preparation.” (Resp. Br., p.15.) The State
argues that assertion is waived because Mr. Anderson “cites no law in support of his argument
that such things at the prosecutor’s opening statement or response to a motion to suppress
somehow alter or diminish the notice provided in the information.” (See Resp. Br., p.15.)
However, the State has also invoked the standards governing variances. (See Resp.
Br., p.14.) “[A] variance is held to require reversal of the conviction only when it deprives the
defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy.” State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18 (1985). Assuming the issue at hand here involves an asserted
variance, the notice element would require the Court “to determine whether the record suggests
the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of
his defense.” See id. at 418. Thus, this Court may look at the record, including the State’s
allegations made prior to Mr. Anderson’s trial testimony. Mr. Anderson’s assertions on this
point are not waived. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263.
The alleged act of consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop was a separate
and distinct act. Theoretically speaking, the State could have charged Mr. Anderson with a new
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count of possession of a controlled substance, or with misdemeanor being under the influence of
a controlled substance pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732C. The State instead attempted to secure a
verdict on the basis of the act as uncharged conduct, impacting Mr. Anderson’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The State committed prosecutorial
misconduct by contending during closing arguments that the jury could convict Mr. Anderson for
uncharged conduct, violating Mr. Anderson’s unwaived constitutional right to due process.

C.

The State’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Plainly Exists And Is Not Harmless
The State has not offered any specific argument on whether the prosecutorial misconduct

plainly exists, or on whether it was not harmless.

(See Resp. Br., pp.10-16.)

Thus,

Mr. Anderson would submit that he has satisfied those two prongs of fundamental error review,
for the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief and incorporated herein. (See App. Br., pp.2526.)
The State committed prosecutorial misconduct by contending in closing arguments that
the jury could convict Mr. Anderson for possession of methamphetamine based on the uncharged
conduct of consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop. By arguing the jury could
convict Mr. Anderson for uncharged conduct, the State violated his unwaived right to due
process. The State’s prosecutorial misconduct plainly exists, and was not harmless. Thus,
Mr. Anderson has met all three prongs of fundamental error review. Mr. Anderson’s conviction
for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) should be vacated, and the case
should be remanded to the district court for a new trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
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III.
The District Court Erred When It Did Not Give A Unanimity Jury Instruction For The Charge Of
Possession Of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine), Because The Jury Was Faced With
Two Distinct Acts Of Possession

A.

Introduction
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court erred when it did not give a unanimity jury

instruction.

The jury was faced with the distinct acts of possession by consuming

methamphetamine before the traffic stop, and possession of the residue found in the safe. Thus,
the district court should have instructed the jury that it must unanimously agree on the specific
act constituting the charged offense.

Although Mr. Anderson did not submit a proposed

unanimity instruction, he asserts the district court’s failure to give such an instruction was
fundamental error. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226-28.

B.

Not Giving A Unanimity Instruction Violated Mr. Anderson’s Unwaived Constitutional
Rights To A Unanimous Jury Verdict And To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
Mr. Anderson asserts the district court, by not giving a unanimity instruction, violated his

unwaived constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict and to be free from double jeopardy.
The circumstances of Mr. Anderson’s conduct and his intent and objectives show possession by
consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop and possession of the residue were separate
and distinct offenses. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). Based on the multiple
instances of alleged criminal conduct, the district court should have instructed the jury “that it
must unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to the offense.” See id. at 711.
The State contends Mr. Anderson has not shown a violation of his unwaived
constitutional rights.

The State argues, “in this case, the simultaneous possession of

methamphetamine in a baggie and methamphetamine residue on paraphernalia were not separate
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crimes.” (Resp. Br., p.19.) According to the State, Mr. Anderson’s “simultaneous possession of
both a baggie of methamphetamine and methamphetamine residue on paraphernalia was the
same act of possession with the same intent . . . .” (Resp. Br., p.19.) However, the evidence
presented did not support a determination that Mr. Anderson had the baggy found in the jail
booking shower area in his possession during the traffic stop. Neither one of the arresting
officers testified that Mr. Anderson admitted to them that consumed methamphetamine before
the traffic stop. (See generally Tr., pp.115-81, 247-64.) Officer Miller testified he saw a plastic
baggy with “420” printed on it near Mr. Anderson’s feet during the traffic stop (see Tr., p.141,
L.20 – p.143, L.1), but the officer did not testify that he also saw at that time the baggy later
found in the booking shower area.
The State also argues, “[e]ating the baggie of methamphetamine did not divest
[Mr.] Anderson of possession, it merely, at least for a time, meant the methamphetamine had
changed containers.” (Resp. Br., p.20.) However, “a jury must find a criminal defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of possessing, either actually or constructively, a controlled
substance.” See State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 755 (1976). If a controlled substance is not in a
defendant’s actual possession, the State must establish constructive possession, namely that the
defendant “knew of the drugs and had the power and intention to control them.” See State v.
Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242 (1999).
In this case, there was no evidence that Mr. Anderson was, at the time of the traffic stop,
in actual possession of the methamphetamine he had allegedly consumed. Nor would the State
be able to show Mr. Anderson was in constructive possession of that methamphetamine. Once
he consumed the methamphetamine and it entered his body, he was not in constructive
possession because he no longer had the power and intention to control the substance. See
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State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in State v.
Ortega, 297 P.3d 57 (Wash. 2013) (“Once a narcotic is injected into the vein, or swallowed
orally, it is no longer in the individual’s control for purposes of possession.”); State v.
Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 211 (Kan. 1983) (“Once a controlled substance is within a person’s
system, the power of the person to control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an
end. . . . Evidence of a controlled substance after it is assimilated in a person’s blood does not
establish possession or control of that substance.”); State v. Daline, 175 Or. App. 625, 632 (Or.
Ct. App. 2001) (“[C]onsumption of a controlled substance does not constitute possession of a
controlled substance because once it is in the bloodstream a person can no longer exercise
dominion or control over it . . . .”). See generally State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484 (2013) (leaving
open the question of whether one is in possession of a drug after injecting, smoking, or
consuming it).
In light of the above, because Mr. Anderson was not in possession, actual or constructive,
of the methamphetamine he consumed after he consumed it, the act of possession through
consumption was temporally distinct from possessing the methamphetamine in the safe. This
temporal distinction reinforces the conclusion that there were two separate incidents, each
involving a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus. See Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182.

C.

The District Court’s Error In Not Giving A Unanimity Instruction Plainly Exists And Is
Not Harmless
The State has not offered any specific argument on whether this error plainly exists, or on

whether it was not harmless. (See Resp. Br., pp.16-21.) Thus, Mr. Anderson would submit that
he has satisfied those two prongs of fundamental error review, for the reasons contained in the
Appellant’s Brief and incorporated herein. (See App. Br., pp.33-34.)
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By not giving a unanimity jury instruction, the district court violated Mr. Anderson’s
unwaived constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict and to be free of double jeopardy.
The district court’s error plainly exists, and was not harmless. Thus, Mr. Anderson’s judgment
of conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) should be vacated,
and the matter should be remanded to the district court for a new trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 228.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment for possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), and remand the matter to the district court for the entry of a
judgment of acquittal. Alternatively, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and remand
the matter to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 21st day of September, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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